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ENFORCING AFFIRMATIVE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
OBLIGATIONS AND SHEFF V. O'NEILL
JUSTIN R. LONG'
INTRODUCTION

While the United States Constitution is largely a grant of powers
to a narrowly limited national legislature,' the state constitutions typically act to constrain legislatures imbued with plenary power.2 Similarly, federal courts have jurisdiction sharply restricted by federal constitutional limits,3 while state courts have broad common-law-making
authority. These distinctions are particularly acute in litigation over
the affirmative obligations state constitutions impose on state legislatures.
The United States Congress may make laws affecting interstate
commerce, 5 patents,6 or federal property,7 for example, but it is diffit Graduate 1995, Hartford Public High School; A.B. 1999, Harvard College; J.D.
Candidate 2003, University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful to ProfessorJohn C. Brittain
of the Thurgood Marshall School of Law and Attorney Philip Tegeler, Legal Director
of the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation, for generously sharing their
knowledge of the Sheff case with me. I also received welcome editorial suggestions
from Professor Brittain, Attorney Tegeler, and Sarah Donovan. All remaining errors
are my own.
I See, a.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (declaring Congress's
authority to be limited to its enumerated powers).
2 See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, No. 346, 665 So. 2d 1357, 1359 (Ala.
1995)
("While the legislature's broad governmental power is plenary in character, it is not
absolute and is subject to the express restrictions of the state constitution."); see also
Robert F. Williams, Comment, On the Importance of a Theory of Legislative Power Under
State Constitutions, 15 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 57, 60 (1995) (noting that state legislatures
have plenary power while Congress has only enumerated powers).
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996) (explaining that federal courts cannot be granted jurisdiction beyond that awarded in Article III of the
U.S. Constitution).
4 See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REv. 875, 875 (1991) (discussing
the ersistent vitality of state courts' common law capacities).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to "regulate commerce").
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (permitting Congress to establish patents).
7 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (authorizing Congress to regulate government
property).
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cult if not impossible to imagine a cause of action against the United
States because of a congressional decision not to enter these fields.
The federal legislature shall not make laws abridging freedom of
speech," imposing bills of attainder,9 or granting aristocratic tides,'
among other things; where Congress violates these prohibitions, the
courts remain largely available to vitiate the forbidden action.'"
In contrast, in addition to imposing permissive and negative obligations like those found in the U.S. Constitution, state constitutions
typically impose various affirmative constitutional obligations on state
legislatures: they shall balance the budget, 2 protect the environment, 13 reapportion electoral districts, 4 or provide free public education. 15 When the states operating under such affirmative obligations

U.S. CONST. amend. I (precluding Congress from impairing free speech).
§ 9, cl. 3 (barring bills of attainder).
10U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (prohibiting the granting of titles of nobility).
8

9 U.S. CONST. art. I,

But cf Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights
in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1326 (1984) (arguing that even negative rights

can be thought of as imposing affirmative obligations on government since, in the
modern administrative state, "all rights are to some extent positive, for the government
is often in a position to deal mortal blows to the exercise of rights by simply ceasing to
intervene").
12 See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 9 (requiring
that the state's expenditures not
exceed its revenues); see also Donald B. Tobin, The Balanced Budget Amendment: Will
Judges Become Accountants? A Look at State Experiences, 12 J.L. & POL. 153, 155 (1996)

(noting that "forty-eight of the fifty states have some type of balanced budget restriction"). The Montana provision was recently construed as an affirmative obligation in
Nicholson v. Cooney, 877 P.2d 486, 491 (Mont. 1994) (holding, inter alia, that the constitutional obligation to balance the budget "places a restriction on the legislature").
1
See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (declaring that "the State and its political subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii's natural beauty and all natural resources");
see also Roland M. Frye, Jr., EnvironmentalProvisionsin State Constitutions,5 Envtl. L. Rep.

(Envtl. L. Inst.) 50,028 (1975) (describing state constitutional protections of natural
resources).
14 See, e.g., MASS. CONST. amend. art. CI (outlining the legislature's
responsibility
to apportion voting districts); see alsoJeffrey G. Hamilton, Comment, Deeper into the Political Thicket: Racial and Political Gerrymanderingand the Supreme Court, 43 EMORY LJ.

1519, 1542, 1552-64 (1994) (noting that state legislatures generally have primary control over voting districts, subject to federal constitutional constraints).
15See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, cl. 1 (requiring the legislature to provide a
"thorough and efficient" public education); see also Kelly Thompson Cochran, Comment, Beyond School Financing: Defining the ConstitutionalRight to an Adequate Education,

78 N.C. L. REV. 399, 408 (2000) (showing that all fifty states have constitutional provisions providing for public education).
For a more crabbed view of state constitutional affirmative obligations, consider
Justice Norcott's opinion in Moore v. Ganim, 660 A.2d 742, 760-64 (Conn. 1995), denying a claim that Connecticut had an affirmative constitutional obligation to provide for
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fail to comply, state courts are faced with the challenge of enforcing
constitutional provisions against their own legislatures.
This Comment will attempt precisely to identify the difficulties of
judicial enforcement of affirmative constitutional obligations and will
suggest that taking procedural formalities more seriously may result in
effective enforcement. This issue will be examined through the lens
of ongoing school desegregation efforts under the Connecticut Constitution.
Part I of this Comment will discuss the history of Connecticut's
constitutional litigation concerning school desegregation and outline
problems with enforcing the state supreme court's landmark 1996 de6
While the facts and law of this case
segregation case, Sheff v. ONeill.1
will be addressed with specific attention to the Connecticut context,
the issues uncovered illuminate problems of nationwide concern.
Part II will examine possible implied affirmative obligations in the
Federal Constitution and consider how federal courts have enforced
those obligations. More significantly, this Part will review efforts by
some of Connecticut's sister states to enforce their own affirmative
constitutional obligations.
Part III will discuss broad problems inherent in judicial action
mandating legislative conduct. Among these problems is the possibility that state legislatures may refuse to comply with their courts' decrees, a potentially serious threat to the legitimacy of state constitutionalism. As a solution, this Comment argues that state courts
seeking to enforce affirmative obligations should make bold, morally
confident decrees, but in close technical conformity with traditional
concepts of civil procedure and legal formalism.
I. CONNECTICUT'S SHEFF LITIGATION
Developing an understanding of the Sheff case and its effects on
Connecticut requires attention to a narrative beginning long before

its indigent citizens. Although Connecticut's constitution includes explicit obligations
to balance the budget, protect the environment, and reapportion electoral districts,
the Moore court thought that provisions relating to the public schools and state university were "the only constitutional provisions, recognized to date, that impose affirmative obligations on the part of the state to expend public funds to afford benefits to its
citizenry." Id. at 761.
16 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996) (holding that Connecticut has an affirmative constitutional obligation to eliminate de facto segregation in Hartford-area public
schools).
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seventeen schoolchildren sued their governor in 1989. School desegregation under the Connecticut Constitution implicates a complex socio-legal history extending back to the earliest days of the Connecticut
Colony. While the characters and setting of this story are particular to
the small state in question, the themes are far broader and more profound. Any government's relationship with its children is a sensitive
and potentially controversial topic with inextricable moral concerns.
Similarly, the effects of any law-inspired change in race relations extend well beyond law into morality and the society's very conception
of itself." When, as with school desegregation, the race-tinged relationship between a government and its children is formally defined by
the government's founding document, official decisions are likely to
be affective as well as rational and cultural as well as legal.18 The three
strands of Connecticut history described below-public schools, state
constitutionalism, and race relations-entwine from the earliest colonial days through the latest court opinions to form the story studied
here. l'

See, e.g., Nelson Mandela, Acceptance Speech at the Nobel Peace Prize
Award
Ceremony, Oslo, Norway (Dec. 10, 1993) (predicting that the legal end of apartheid
would change the whole South African society, "because we will have created a society
which recognises that all people are born equal, with each entitled in equal measure to
life, liberty, prosperity, human rights and good governance"), at http://
www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/speeches/nobelnrm.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2002).
i8 New England state constitutions have
been described as especially expressive of
the authoring communities' philosophical and moral values. See Daniel J. Elazar, The
17

Principles and Traditions Underlying State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS 11 (1982) (positing
that early New England constitutions "are basically philosophic documents" and that
they "emphasize[] the constitution as a covenant establishing a civil society"), reprinted
in ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 67, 68 (3d ed. 1999).
19 On the use of storytelling in legal writing generally,
see Shulamit Almog, As I
Read, I Weep--In Praise of JudicialNarrative, 26 OKLA. CrItv U. L. REV. 471, 473 (2001)
("[Narrative] has a way of penetrating and manifesting itself clearly and forcibly, even
after being minimized, disguised, or obscured by the legal course of action."). Cf
Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives,68 TEX. L. REv. 381, 385 (1989) (examining the
narrative aspects of two United States Supreme Court opinions on race relations and
noting that "within the legal culture, where moralizing discourse is everywhere, narrative exists, and, indeed, narrative abounds.").
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A. The Early History of PublicEducation, Constitutionalism,and Race
Relations in Connecticut
Hartford was founded in 1635 by Reverend Thomas Hooker, who
walked with his congregation south from their Massachusetts church,' °
located one block away from the site of what was soon to become the
Bay Colony's first public university (today known as Harvard College).2' Thus, even before the Connecticut Colony was organized, its
founders were familiar with the value of state-sponsored schooling and
came from a community committed to the ideal of public education.
Within ten years of settlement upon the banks of the Connecticut
River, the fledgling Hartford community hired a teacher, established a
school tax, set a curriculum, and invited all community children to be
educated regardless of their economic status.22
While the early Connecticut Colony was attending to the education of its youth, it also established a written framework of government, the Fundamental Orders.23 Under the authority of the government established by the Fundamental Orders, a colonial diplomat
obtained from King Charles II a royal charter that was highly favorable
to the colonists. 4 By 1697, local reverence for the charter had grown
so strong that when King James II sent a military governor from Boston to Hartford to revoke it, local officials hid the charter in a nearby
oak tree rather than surrender it.25 Connecticut's affection for its

20 See SONDRA ASTOR STAVE,

ACHIEVING RACIAL BALANCE:

CONTEMPORARY SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 85-86 (1995)

CASE STUDIES OF

(describing the settlement of

Hartford by Thomas Hooker's congregation).
21 For a detailed description of Massachusetts's early official support
for Harvard
College, see McDuffy v. Sec'y of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 531-32
(Mass. 1993) (explaining that "[i]n 1636, the General Court of the Bay Colony
founded Harvard College with a public grant of 400 pounds" and that public financial
support continued until 1828).
22 See STAVE, supra note 20, at 87 (describing the start of Connecticut's public education system).
23 See Ellen A. Peters, Common Law Antecedents of Constitutional
Law in Connecticut,
53 ALB. L. REV. 259, 259-60 (1989) (reviewing Connecticut's constitutional history, including the promulgation in 1638 of a document of constitutional principles-the
FundamentalOrders).
24 See Wesley W. Horton, Law and Society in Far-Away Connecticut,
8 CONN. J. INT'L L.
547, 553 (1993) (describing the origins of Connecticut's charter and constitution).
25 Id.; see also CONN. SEC'Y OF THE STATE,

CONNECTICUT

STATE

REGISTER &

MANUAL 871 (2002) (describing how Captain Joseph Wadsworth swiped and hid the
charter from the British nobleman Sir Edmond Andros in 1687). The Charter Oak's
species is the official state tree of Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-110 (2001), and
is depicted on the U.S. Mint's 1999 Connecticut quarter.
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charter continued even after the colony's transition to statehood under the United States Constitution; the charter remained Connecticut's foundational document until 1818, when the first state constitution was established by convention. 21
While Connecticut exhibited strong support for both its public
schools and foundational documents from the beginning, the state's
history of race relations is less endearing. Although slavery was legally
phased out beginning in 1784 and the Underground Railroad passed
through the state, 27 "the city [of Hartford] was not particularly hospitable to blacks. 28 Economic and political discrimination severely restricted the rights of Connecticut's African-American citizens.2 9 Because they could not legally own land, black Connecticutians were
forced by economic necessity to live in cities, where rental housing
and service sector jobs were more readily available. ° In this way, the
state's segregated housing patterns are the vestiges of early and longenduring racist laws.
In 1909, before large numbers of African-Americans fleeing
southern poverty and Jim Crow discrimination had moved to Connecticut,

1

the general assembly passed a law directing schoolchildren

to attend their neighborhood schools. 2 In 1941, during the period of
mass migration of African-Americans into the state's urban centers, 3
the general assembly passed an act setting school district lines coterminously with town borders. That action linked housing discrimina-

See Horton, supra note 24, at 553-54 (noting that Connecticut operated under
its
colonial charter until a publicly held democratic constitutional convention in 1818).
27 See STAVE, supra note 20, at 94 ("A column in the weekly Connecticut
Courantduring 1784 noted that the General Assembly had provided for the gradual emancipation
of the 6500 slaves then in the state .....
28 Id. at
95.
29 See id. (describing the persistence of discriminatory conditions, including denial
of suffrage, residential segregation, and bans on government employment, through
the 18th and 19th centuries).
26

30 Id.

31 See id. (chronicling the doubling of the black population in
Connecticut between 1910 and 1930).
.2 SeeSheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1273 (Conn. 1996)
("Since at least 1909, as a
result of another state statute ... schoolchildren have been assigned to the public
school district in :which they reside." (citation omitted)).
33 See STAVE, supra note 20, at 96 ("With the beginning of World War Ii, more
blacks came north to work in the defense industries.").
34

Sheff 678 A.2d at 1273.
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tion with school demographics in a way that would gradually produce
viciously segregated schools. 5
Connecticut's history of race relations in the public schools was
further complicated by a significant influx of Latino families, primarily from Puerto Rico, beginning in the early 1940s." By 1970, Connecticut's Puerto Rican population had risen to 88,361 , roughly 2.9%
of the state's total population.38 In addition to the problems of racial
isolation already present in the African-American community in Hartford, the arrival of Latino immigrants introduced the stubborn problem of linguistic isolation to the city's schools.39
In the midst of these seachanges in the complexion of Connecticut's citizenry, a constitutional convention was called in 1965 to revise
the 1814 constitution. 40 There, convention delegates proposed and
debated two new sections for the Connecticut Constitution: article I,
section 20, prohibiting segregation in any state program or policy; and
article VIII, section 1, establishing a state duty to provide public
schools. 4' These provisions would become the textual foundation of
the state supreme court's holding in the landmark case of Sheff v.
O'Neill.

35 On racism in housing distribution, see STAVE, supra note 20,
at 96 (noting that a
1944 study showed Hartford to be still "rife with discrimination in public and private
employment and in public and private housing," despite various nominal efforts to
improve civil rights). But cf Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 121 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("[L]ocal school assignments[] do not offend the [Federal] Constitution
when individual private choices concerning work or residence produce schools with high
black populations." (emphasis added)).
36 See STAVE, supra note 20, at 97 ("Meanwhile, Hispanics from
Puerto Rico, Cuba,
and Central and South America had been migrating to Hartford since the 1940s to
neighborhoods in both the North and South Ends.").
37 Id. at 98.
38 See Connecticut Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 to 1990,
Population Division, U.S. Bureau of the Census, at http://www.census.gov/population/
cencounts/ct190090.txt (last visited Oct. 18, 2002) (reporting Connecticut's total
population in 1970 as 3,031,709).
39 See STAVE, supra note 20, at 99 ("The issue of bilingual education was of particular concern during the early 1970s.").
40 See Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1283 (Conn. 1996) (discussing
the 1965
constitutional convention).
41 I.
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B. The Case Proceeds in the SuperiorCourt
By April 1989, Hartford's public schools were educating their students in an atmosphere of severe racial and economic isolation and
the situation was getting worse. 42 Elizabeth Horton Sheff, an AfricanAmerican community activist, politician, and mother of a Hartford
fourth grader named Milo, decided to sue Democratic Governor William O'Neill to demand that the situation be fixed.43 She joined with
sixteen other African-American, Latino, and white plaintiffs from the
ConstituHartford metropolitan area to assert that the Connecticut
S 44
tion guaranteed them an integrated public education. The nature of
the plaintiffs' demands was unprecedented, both in Connecticut and
across the country.4 5
Although the plaintiffs' legal theory that the state officials had an
affirmative obligation to desegregate the public schools asserted a
dramatic and controversial claim against the state, the complaint was
also noteworthy for three of its somewhat technical characteristics.
42 SeeSheffv. O'Neill, No. CV89-0360977S, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS
1148, at *10
(Apr. 12, 1995) (recognizing the parties' stipulation that Hartford schools were 90.5%
composed of racial and ethnic minorities in the 1987-1988 school year); see also Richard Fossey, The Hartford Desegregation Case: Is There a JudicialRemedy for Racially Isolated
Inner-City School Districts?, in 13 READINGS ON EQUAL EDUCATION: FORTY YEARS AFTER
THE BROWN DECISION:
IMPLICATIONS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION FOR U.S.

EDUCATION 157, 161 (Kofi Lomotey & Charles Teddlie eds., 1996) (observing that
93% of Hartford public school students were African-American or Latino in 1990).
43 See Rachel F. Moran, Milo's Miracle, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1079, 1079 (1997) (noting
the Sheff family's involvement in the litigation); see also Carole Bass, The Iron Sheff,
(identifying Ms. Sheff), at http://
NEW HAVEN ADVOC., Sept. 27, 2001
www.newhavenadvocate.com/articles/ironsheff.html.
44 See Fossey, supra note 42, at 161-62 (explaining the start of the Sheff case). The
legal team representing the schoolchildren was composed of attorneys renowned in
Connecticut's civil rights circles; plaintiffs' counsel included the activist John C. Brittain, then a law professor at the University of Connecticut and subsequently Dean of
the Thurgood Marshall School of Law; Wesley Horton, a state appellate litigation specialist and constitutional scholar who had successfully litigated the groundbreaking
school finance case, Horton v. Meskill 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977), in the 1970s; Martha
Stone, Director of the Center for Children's Advocacy at the University of Connecticut
School of Law and former Legal Director of the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union
Foundation; and Philip D. Tegeler, current Legal Director of the Connecticut Civil
Liberties Union Foundation. National civil rights organizations also participated in
representing the plaintiffs, including the ACLU and the Puerto Rican Legal Defense
and Education Fund. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund took an early and lasting leadership role in the case.
T Fossey, supra note 42, at 166 ("Sheffs demand-that a state court disregard local
boundaries to shape a large-scale desegregation plan-is unprecedented in reported
court cases.").
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First, the case was brought on behalf of the seventeen named Hartford-area plaintiffs individually, not as a class action. 6 One might
have expected the plaintiffs to choose the class action device for
achieving broad institutional reform altering the structural relationship between government and the people, but the plaintiffs' lawyers
preferred not to represent a formal class 7 Second, the primary relief
sought was a declaratory judgment; the plaintiffs did not enter court
proposing any concrete plan or specific injunctive remedy. 48 Although Connecticut's civil practice rules require that stringent notice
be issued when a declaratory judgment is sought,49 the declaratory
judgment action need not meet the full panoply of class action procedural hurdles." Furthermore, the declaratory judgment action may
be a judicially preferred form for the adjudication of constitutional
rights in Connecticut.51
The third procedurally noteworthy aspect of the case is that the
plaintiffs sued the governor, state treasurer, comptroller, school board
members, and commissioner of education, all in their official capacities, but did not sue the State of Connecticut, the general assembly, or
any legislative officials directly. 2 The attorney general argued that
46

See Sheff, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1148, at *1 (noting that the suit was initiated

"by seventeen named plaintiffs" as a declaratory judgment action and omitting mention of a class).
47 Interview with Philip Tegeler, Counsel for the Sheff Plaintiffs and Legal
Director,
Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation, in Hartford, Conn. (Mar. 13, 2002).
48 Id.
49 See CONN. R. CT. § 17-56 (requiring that "[a]ll persons who have
an interest in
the subject matter of the requested declaratory judgment that is direct, immediate and
adverse to the interest of one or more of the [parties to] the action" be joined in or
given reasonable notice of the action and mandating certification that the notice requirement has been met).
50 Interview with Philip Tegeler, supra note 47. The preclusive effect of
a declaratoryjudgment in institutional reform cases is unclear. Id.
I See Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 365 (Conn. 1977) ("The declaratory
judgment procedure in Connecticut... is peculiarly well adapted to the judicial determination of controversies concerning constitutional rights .... ).
52 See Sheffv. O'Neill, No. CV89-0360977S, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS
1148, at *1
(Apr. 12, 1995) ("The defendants... were the incumbent governor, William A.
O'Neill, or his successors in that office, the state board of education, its individual
members, the state commissioner of education ....
the state treasurer and the state
comptroller, as well as their successors in those offices."). While the general assembly
might or might not have been an available defendant, cf Nielsen v. Connecticut, 670
A.2d 1288, 1289-90 (Conn. 1996) (holding that where the plaintiffs sued the state directly "to compel the General Assembly to enact legislation that would implement the
constitutional spending cap" there was no subject matter jurisdiction), the State of
Connecticut's sovereign immunity would not apply to protect the general assembly
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this list of defendants was inadequate and that the suit should be dismissed for failure to join necessary parties (including the City of Hartford), but that motion was defeated and subsequently abandoned on
appeal." A defense motion for summary judgment was denied in
1992. 4
In January 1993, nearly four years after the original filing, a trial
The
finally began before superior court Judge Harry Hammer.
plaintiffs' witnesses were put in the uncomfortable position of emphasizing the fundamental failures of the city's schools in order to buttress the plaintiffs' claim of an inadequate education under the state
constitution.5 6 This was most likely embarrassing to the school offi-

cials. Given the watching and credulous suburban parents' eagerness
to believe the worst about city schools, the testimony was probably also
damaging to any chance of persuading them that Hartford's schools
were a good place for their children. Shortly after the testimony began, Governor O'Neill's successor, Lowell Weicker, Jr.," publicly ac-

from claims of constitutional violations. See Horton, 376 A.2d at 364 (holding that sovereign immunity does not apply where constitutional violations are alleged). National
civil rights lawyers might follow the federal fiction embodied in Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 149-60 (1908) (reviewing case law holding that a plaintiff may not sue a state
in federal court), out of custom, but in state court the choice to exclude defendants
otherwise available should be treated by courts as meaningful and intentional. A court
presented with an intentionally limited list of defendants should therefore fashion its
inquiry, as well as any remedy, with reference only to the named defendants, not to
those who might have been included.
53 See Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1275 n.14 (Conn.
1996) ("The defendants
have failed to pursue their defenses based on sovereign immunity, stare decisis and the
plaintiffs' failure to join necessary parties.").
54 Sheffv. O'Neill, 609 A.2d 1072, 1076 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1992).
5 Fossey, supra note 42, at 161.
56 See Susan E. Eaton & Gary A. Orfield, Brown v. Board of Education and the
Continuing Strugglefor Desegregated Schools, in 13 READINGS ON EQUAL EDUCATION: FORTY
YEARS AFTER THE BROWN DECISION: IMPLICATIONS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION FOR
U.S. EDUCATION, supra note 42, at 117, 133 ("[T]eachers and principals testified at the
Sheff trial that their schools are overcome by the burdens of poverty and isolation."); see
also Sheff 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1148 passim (referring to expert testimony and the
testimony of Hartford public school employees). Such testimony from city insiders did
nothing to improve the image of Hartford schools in the eyes of suburban parents,
upon whose cooperation any voluntary plan of integration would depend.
57 Governor Weicker was a former U.S. Senator who had abandoned the Republican Party to run for governor as an independent. He received the John F. Kennedy
Library Foundation's "Profile in Courage Award" in 1992 for successfully advocating
the introduction of a state income tax at great political risk. John F. Kennedy Profile in
Courage Award Recipients, John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library Foundation, at http://
www.jfklibrary.org/pica-recipients.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2002).
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knowledged the need for major state-wide school desegregation ef58
forts.
Despite Weicker's acknowledgment, however, the state continued a vigorous defense in the courtroom.
Judge Hammer did not submit his decision in the case until April
1995, six years after it was first filed. 9 While admitting the prevalence
of racial and economic isolation in the Hartford area, 60 Judge Hammer ruled that there was insufficient state action to sustain a claim
against the defendants. 6 Oddly, the bulk of his legal reasoning was
derived from the judicial writings of U.S. Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas, despite the purely state-law basis for the plaintiffs'
claims.62 Governor Weicker's successor in office, Republican John G.
Rowland, was elated at the state officials' victory over the schoolchildren; in a public faux pas he would later regret, Governor Rowland
greeted news of the decision with a bottle of champagne.63

58 See Eaton & Orfield, supra note 56, at 133 (remarking
that "even Connecticut's
governor, Lowell Weicker.... cited school segregation as a serious educational problem .... ").
59 Fossey, supra note 42, at
161.
60 See Sheff 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1148, at *8-9 (noting the defendants'
admission that "'there is a relatively high concentration of children from poor families and
black and Hispanic students' in the Hartford public schools compared to the public
schools in most of the twenty-one towns surrounding Hartford").
61 See id. at *89 ("The court.., finds that the plaintiffs have failed
to prove that
'state action is a direct and sufficient cause of the conditions' which are the subject
matter of the plaintiffs' complaint... , and that accordingly the constitutional claims
asserted by the plaintiffs need not be addressed.").
62 See id. at *80-89 (following Justice Douglas's treatment
of various de facto school
desegregation cases because he was "the principal and most consistent proponent of
the view that strict constitutional liability... should be imposed on local and state governments for conditions of segregation that arose from demographic, social and economic forces"). In a case based solely on the Connecticut Constitution, Judge Hammer's Memorandum of Decision cited ten U.S. Supreme Court cases and seven other
federal cases, but only five Connecticut Supreme Court cases and four in-state lower
court decisions. Shef 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1148. "[E]ven many of those who
were pleased [with the decision] were surprised .... that the decision for a case based
on state law was decided on federal law and federal cases." STAVE, supra note 20, at 125
(citations omitted).
See Christopher Keating, Rowland Says He's Sorry: Champagne in Sheff Case Called
Error,HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 21, 1995, at A3 ("Gov. John G. Rowland apologized
Thursday for bringing out a bottle of champagne last week to celebrate the state's victory in the Sheff vs. O'Neill school desegregation case."). Attorney General Richard
Blumenthal, an independently elected Democrat, later commented that the gesture
was inappropriate. Id.
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C. The CaseProceeds in the Supreme Court
Mindful of the case's long pendency in the trial court, the Connecticut Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs' request for direct review, bypassing the intermediate appellate court.64 Apparently dissatisfied with Judge Hammer's Memorandum of Decision, the court
ordered a clarification of the lower court's findings of fact.61 Judge
Hammer complied and submitted a supplemental opinion that listed
161 distinct findings. 6 The supreme court heard arguments in the
case in September 1995; in an opinion by Chief Justice Ellen A. Peters" released on July 9, 1996, a divided court reversed the trial court
and held for the plaintiffs."g
The case's political thorniness produced a flowery majority opinion, an emotional concurrence, and a furious dissent. The court's
holding, at least, is clear: Connecticut has an affirmative obligation
under the state constitution to repair the racial isolation in Hartford's
public schools.6 9 The reasoning and the remedy, however, remain
somewhat obscure behind the chief justice's rhetorical flourishes. °

64

See Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1272 (Conn. 1996) ("Because of the impor-

tance of the novel and controversial questions of constitutional law raised in this litigation... we transferred to this court the plaintiffs' appeal .... Noting that the plaintiffs' complaint had been pending since 1989, we held a special hearing . .
65

Id.

66Sheffv. O'Neill, 1995 Conn. LEXIS 249 (Conn.June 27,
1995).
67 ChiefJustice Peters was one of only nine women nationwide
who had served as
a state chiefjustice by the fall of 1997. John B. Wefing, State Supreme CourtJustices: Who
Are They?, 32 NEw ENG. L. REv. 47, 57 (1997). Chief Justice Peters was among the
"59.9% of [state supreme court] justices [who] attended law school in the state where
they would eventually serve," id. at 82, having graduated from Yale Law School, where
she also served as a professor until her appointment to the supreme court in 1978.
Michael F. J. Piecuch, High Court Study, State ConstitutionalLaw in the Land of Steady
Habits: ChiefJusticeEllen A. Peters and the Connecticut Supreme Court, 60 ALB. L. REv. 1757,

1759 n.] (1997).
68 Sheff 678 A.2d at
1267.
69 See id. at 1270-71 ("We hold today that the needy
schoolchildren of Hartford
have waited long enough. The constitutional imperatives.., of our state constitution
entitle the plaintiffs to relief.").
70 For a remarkable example of limpid language coupled with
legal opacity, consider the following climactic passage:
In staying our hand, we do not wish to be misunderstood about the urgency of
finding an appropriate remedy for the plight of Hartford's public schoolchildren. Every passing day denies these children their constitutional right to a
substantially equal educational opportunity. Every passing day shortchanges
these children in their ability to learn to contribute to their own well-being
and to that of this state and nation. We direct the legislature and the execu-
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This Part will first review the logic behind the court's holding and
then address the remedy provided by the court.
Judge Hammer's reliance on federal case law was not adopted by
the Connecticut Supreme Court in Sheff71 The majority explicitly rejected the applicability of federal desegregation precedent for two
reasons. First, "there is no right to education under the United States
[Clonstitution," while the Connecticut Constitution does include
education as a fundamental right.72 Second, "the federal cases are
guided by principles of federalism" that are irrelevant to a state court's
construction of a state constitution.m Instead, Chief Justice Peters
turned to two independent sources of state law-the court's own
precedents and the history of the 1965 state constitutional convention-to guide the court's construction of the constitution's text.
The education and equal protection clauses of the Connecticut
Constitution 74 had been the objects of extensive litigation in Horton v.
Meskill, a 1977 case concerning equitable school financing. 75 To reach
the merits of the plaintiffs' claims in Horton, the supreme court denied
that sovereign immunity protected the defendant officials' conduct to
the extent that such conduct was unconstitutional.7 6 Turning to the
merits, the court quoted a 1909 case noting that "'Connecticut has for
centuries recognized it as her right and duty to provide for the proper

tive branch to put the search for appropriate remedial measures at the top of
their respective agendas.
Id. at 1290 (emphasis added).
71 See id. at 1279 ("[W]e are not persuaded that
we should adopt these [federal]
precedents as a matter of state constitutional law.").
72 Id.
73

Id.

CONN. CONST. art. 8, § 1 ("There shall always be free public elementary
and
secondary schools in the state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by
appropriate legislation."); CONN. CONsT. art. 1, § 20 ("No person shall be denied the
equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the
exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights because of religion, race,
color, ancestry, national origin, sex or physical or mental disability.").
75 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977) (holding, in a declaratory judgment action,
that the
state's system of financing public schools was unconstitutional). The lead plaintiff was
Barnaby Horton, now a Hartford state representative and the son of Wesley Horton,
the appellate litigation specialist representing the Sheff plaintiffs. See Bass, supra note
43 ("Horton is not part of the Sheff case, although his dad, Hartford constitutional law
expert Wes Horton, is on the legal team .... Now he's a state representative from
Hartford ....married to a Hartford public school teacher who's used to teaching allblack classes.").
76 See Horton, 376 A.2d at 364 (discussing the sovereign
immunity defense).
74
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education of the young,' ', and pursued a detailed review of the
school financing scheme before affirming the trial court's declaration
of unconstitutionality." The remedy, however, was left to the legislature. The plaintiffs returned to court and the supreme court ruled
again in 1985, eight years after its first holding in the case. The 1985
court applied a relatively deferential review of the legislature's efforts
at reform and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
without ordering a new remedy."O
The Sheff court used the Horton precedents to establish the justiciability of the plaintiffs' suit against the state defendants. 8' The Horton litigation also provided the Sheff court with a rationale for holding
the state strictly liable for its affirmative constitutional obligations."'
To evaluate the nature of those obligations, the Sheff court turned
to the history of constitutionalized public education in Connecticut,
particularly the debate transcripts and committee reports from the
1965 state constitutional convention. The court concluded that the
convention delegates "intended to encompass de facto segregation in
the circumstances presented by the present case.""4 The court also
noted the general assembly's extensive control over the state's

77 Id. at 373-74 (quoting State ex rel. Town of Huntington v. Huntington
Town Sch.
Comm., 74 A. 882, 883 (Conn. 1909)).
78 See id. at 375-76 (finding no error in the superior court's ruling).
79 See id. at 376 (determining that a pending legislative plan
to reform school financing "should serve to stay judicial intervention to afford the General Assembly an
opportunity to take appropriate legislative action").
so See Horton v. Meskill, 486 A.2d 1099, 1110 (Conn. 1985) ("[W]e believe that the
proper test requires the state to prove that the amendments reasonably advanced a rational state policy ....).
81 See Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1276 (Conn. 1996) ("The
plaintiff schoolchildren in the present case invoke the same constitutional provisions to challenge the
constitutionality of state action that the plaintiff schoolchildren invoked in Horton ....
[P]rudential cautions ...do not deprive a court ofjurisdiction.").
82 See id. at 1277 (citing Horton, 376 A.2d at 374-75, for the
proposition that the
state constitution's education and equal protection clauses "impose on the legislature
an affirmative constitutional obligation ....[and] if the legislature fails, for whatever
reason, to take action to remedy substantial inequalities.., its actions and its omissions
constitute state action").
83 See id. at 1283-84 & nn.33-37 (poring over the remarks
of the convention delegates who supported the passage of the education clause). For a different view of the
legislative history behind these constitutional provisions, see Michael Besso's thorough
new work in Sheffv. O'Neill: A Research Note, 34 CONN. L. REv. 315 (2002).
84 Sheff 678 A.2d at
1284.
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schools.85 To support its holding that state action was sufficiently implicated to hold the state accountable for unintentional school segregation, the majority also stridently repeated the trial court's finding
that the statute establishing school district lines coterminously with
town borders "is the single most importantfactor contributing to the present concentration of racial and ethnic minorities in the Hartford
public school system."8 6 Strangely, however, the court's discussion of
the districting statute, although plainly blaming that law for causing
unconstitutional conditions, never directly declared the statute itself
unconstitutional or unenforceable."
The court's bold work in holding the state to be in violation of its
affirmative constitutional obligation was immediately undermined by
its failure to provide a fruitful remedy. The majority opinion provided
plenty of bombast about the importance of finding a remedy,88 but
granted only declaratory relief aimed at politely persuading the general assembly and champagne-popping governor to find a solution using "energy and good will."8 No guidelines were provided as to what
components the court would require of such a solution.
"[J] urisdiction to grant consequential relief, if needed, at some future
time," was retained,0 leaving open the possibility of a later injunctive
remedy.
The court's expression of confidence in the abilities of the political branches to find a solution was emotionally attacked by Governor
Rowland, who told the press that "'[t]here's
nothing courageous

85

See id. at 1285 ("The legislature has created the current school districts, has re-

quired students to attend school and has determined which students will attend a particular school district.").
86 Id. at 1274; see also id. at 1278 ("The trial court
expressly found that the enforcement of these [school districting] statutes constitutes the 'single most important
factor' creating the present racial and ethnic imbalance in the Hartford public school
system."); id. at 1287 ("[T]he districting statute... is the single most important factor
contributing to the concentration of racial and ethnic minorities in the Hartford public school system."); id. at 1289 ("' [TIhe single most importantfactor that contribute[s] to the
present concentration of racial and ethnic minorities in Hartford [is] the town-school district system.... ."' (quoting the trial court's findings) (alterations in original)).
But cf Sheff v. O'Neill, No. CV89-0360977S, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2664, at
*2 (Oct. 15, 1996) ("U]udgment may enter for the plaintiffs declaring.., that the
school districting scheme, as codified ... and as enforced with regard to these plaintiffs, is unconstitutional .... ).
8 See, e.g., Sheff 678 A.2d at 1290 ("Finding a way to cross the racial and
ethnic divide has never been more important than it is today.").
89 Id.
90 Id.
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about reiterating the fact that there's racial imbalance in the cities,
but they want us to solve it."''
The governor also publicly criticized
the chief justice herself, "saying it was 'unfortunate' that one personPeters-could 'take an issue and force it back' on the legislature."9'
Not everyone responded to the court's ruling as angrily as the lead defendant, however. Perhaps predictably, optimistic parents and teachers from urban districts across the state celebrated the court's holding
that the constitution required Connecticut to integrate its schools9
The court's decision to confine its remedy to a declaration of the
plaintiffs' rights was consistent with the form of the plaintiffs' declaratory judgment action (although the plaintiffs had initially requested
undefined injunctive relief as well) . In two important respects, however, the Sheif court ignored the special features of the plaintiffs' case
discussed earlier in this Part.95 First, the court ignored who the plaintiffs were; second, it ignored the identity of the defendants. The
court's rationale focused on the rights of "the schoolchildren who reside in Hartford and other urban centers in Connecticut,"i' but white
schoolchildren from a Hartford suburb made up more than 10% of
the plaintiffs and none of the named plaintiffs was from any of Connecticut's other urban areas. 97 Furthermore, the court's opinion and
remedy (such as it was) were primarily directed against the general assembly,9s which had never been named as a defendant, either in its collective capacity or through any legislative official. 99 The potential

Matthew Daly, Rowland Calls Sheff Ruling 'Easy Way Out': Governor Says Changes
May Not Come for Years, HARTFORD COURANT,July 11, 1996, at Al.
92 Id.
93 See Matthew Kauffman, Stunned Plaintiffs and a Dance
of Joy, HARTFORD
COuRANT, July 10, 1996, at Al] (reporting that one parent "couldn't resist breaking
into a dance ofjoy" following the ruling).
94 See Sheff 678 A.2d at 1290 (observing that the
plaintiffs had not "focused their
attention on the remedial consequences of a substantive decision in their behalf"); id.
at 1271 (stating that the plaintiffs sought "a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief').
95 See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text (discussing several
noteworthy
technical aspects of the case, including the plaintiffs' decision not to name any legislative official as a defendant).
96 Sheff 678 A.2d at 1294
(Berdon,J., concurring).
97 See id. at 1271 n.3 (listing eighteen plaintiffs by name,
race, and hometown).
98 See id. at 1290 (holding that "[p]rudence and sensitivity
to the constitutional
authority of coordinate branches of government" demand that the legislature be given
a chance to remedy the problem before the court compels a solution).
W See id. at 1271 n.4 (naming the defendants and their offices).
9l
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ramifications of the court's sloppiness over the parties' identities will
be discussed in Part III.
D. The Plaintiffs Seek a Remedy and Enforcement of the Supreme Court's
Holding
Two years after the supreme court's holding, segregation between
minorities in Hartford's schools and its suburban neighbors had
grown worse, and the plaintiffs returned to court.1"" In Connecticut,
once ajudge has been reversed on appeal, the case must be remanded
to a different judge," so superior court Judge Julia Aurigemma took
over the case from Judge Hammer.' °
The supreme court had found the general assembly strictly liable
for its constitutional violations, since the legislature had been deemed
responsible for finding a solution but had "enacted no legislation that
was intended to cause either dejure or de facto segregation. 1 3 Logically, where a party is held liable for the unintended consequences of
its acts, good faith can be no defense. However, the remand court's
opinion gives extensive coverage to the state's efforts to study and begin to repair the problem of racial isolation, 4 as if good intentions
could excuse the state's failure to provide an integrated education.
The trial court found that the state's increased spending on "interdistrict cooperative programs, 1 0 "interdistrict magnet schools,'0 6
100See Sheff v. O'Neill, 733 A.2d 925, 938 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (acknowledging
the "undisputed fact that at the time [the plaintiffs] returned to court in March,
1998... the racial imbalance in the Hartford schools had not only not improved, but
had become slightly worse than it was at the time the Supreme Court issued its decision in this case").
101Connecticut law provides:
No judge of any court who tried a case without ajury in which a new trial
is granted, or in which the judgment is reversed by the Supreme Court,
may again try the case. Nojudge of any court who presided over any jury
trial ... in which a new trial is granted, may again preside at the trial of
the case.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-183(c) (2001).
102 See Sheff 733 A.2d at 925 (namingJudge Aurigemma
as the opinion's author).
103 Sheff 678 A.2d at 1288.
104 See, e.g., Sheff 733 A.2d at 927 (implying that the court was impressed by an executive education improvement panel because, inter alia, "even [the] controversial
topic [of mandatory busing] was fully explored [though rejected]").
105 Id. at 928 (outlining a program to fund occasional field trips between city and
suburban schools).
106 Id. at 929 (describing special state-subsidized schools designed to attract suburban students to city schools).
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"charter schools,"'' 7 "minority staff recruitment,"'"

the "choice program,"'0 '° and "lighthouse schools""0 were all important remedial steps
taken by the legislature and the commissioner of education. The
court also noted, as a positive step on the state's part, the significance
of the state's 1997 takeover of Hartford's schools due to the elected
school board members' inability to work together."' In light of these
efforts by the state, all toward purely voluntary integration and none
invalidating the shape of any school district, the trial court held that
the plaintiffs had "returned to court well before any reasonable efforts
could possibly have had any discernible effects."". Conscious of the
supreme court's ambivalence toward rapid, politically unpopular
remedies,"' Judge Aurigemma held for the defendants. Seemingly in
contradiction of the supreme court's holding that the plaintiffs' rights
were judicially enforceable, the court concluded that "[t]he best way
to achieve popular support is not to impose a judicially mandated remedial plan, but to encourage Connecticut's populace as a whole,
both directly and through their elected representatives, to solve the
problems facing the state's schools.""' Convinced that the court was

Id. at 930 (identifying flexibility and accountability as key characteristics of
charter schools).
108 Id. at 931 (asserting that "[t]here is no dispute that increasing the diversity of
107

school staff and administrators ...can play a role in the reduction of racial and ethnic
isolation").
100Id. at 932 (explaining a program designed to send urban students to suburban
schools according to the capacity and willingness of the receiving schools).
110 Id. at 933 (endorsing a program of prototype magnet schools already operating
in New Haven and planned for eventual operation in Hartford).
I See id. at 935 (remarking that "the Hartford board of education was beset
by
such discord that it could not take any effective action" and that in 1997 the legislature
"eliminated the [elected] Hartford board of education and replaced it with the [appointed] state board of trustees as the governing body of the Hartford public
schools").
"2

Id. at 938.

1,4The Supreme Court did not specify a time frame for the reduction of
racial and ethnic isolation. It used the word "urgent" at the same time it
ordered the legislative and executive branches to take action. The Supreme Court was certainly aware that the legislative process is not an instantaneous one and that ... the executive and legislative branches
needed sufficient time to propose and enact meaningful legislation.
Id. at 939.
14

Id. at 943.
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wrong, but restrained
by strategic pragmatism, the plaintiffs decided
15
not to appeal.
Finally, more than a year and a half later, the plaintiffs had waited
long enough and re-filed a motion to enforce the supreme court's
judgment."6 After further delay to allow a legislative response that
never came, the plaintiffs requested that Judge Aurigemma schedule
hearings on the case, which began on April 16, 2002.11' The plaintiffs'
proposed remedy requires a new infusion of state money to improve
Hartford's schools and to expand and improve the interdistrict magnet schools."8 Although the plaintiffs' lawyers agree that merely improving Hartford's schools with new funding will not, by itself, solve
the problem of racial isolation, 9 they have never suggested a mandatory student placement remedy to the courts. 120 As of this writing, it
remains to be seen whether Judge Aurigemma (and subsequently the
supreme court) will respect the plaintiffs' compromising spirit and

See E-mail from John C. Brittain, Plaintiffs' Counsel and Dean of the Thurgood
Marshall School of Law, to Justin Long (Feb. 18, 2002) ("Though harmful to the
schoolchildren to continue the unconstitutional conditions without an appeal, it was
more strategic to wait .... [T]he proof of non-compliance with the Supreme Court's
mandate is more persuasive after waiting three more years.") (on file with author).
116 Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Regarding the
Implementation of the Project
Choice Program and the Interdistrict Magnet School Program in the Hartford Region
at 1, Sheff v. O'Neill, No. X03 CV89-0492119S (Conn. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 28, 2000)
(on file with author).
115

See Robert A. Frahm, Racial Balance Remains an Issue: State Supreme Court to Review New Plan to Integrate Schools, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 15, 2002, at Al (anticipat117

ing the plaintiffs' return to court to seek various concrete remedies).
118 See id. ("The plan calls for more money and sets enrollment
goals, but its central approach-the expansion of magnet schools and of a voluntary program allowing
Hartford children to enroll in suburban schools-is the same path the state already has
begun."); see also Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, Report of Leonard B. Stevens, Ed.D. at 4, Sheff v.
O'Neill, No. X03 CV89-0492119S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 2002) (on file with author)
(reporting the plaintiffs' lead expert's opinion emphasizing "magnet schools and voluntary interdistrict choice of school" as among the minimum elements of an appropriate plan for school desegregation).
119 See E-mail from John C. Brittain, supra note 115 ("More funding
is necessary to
achieve educational equity, but increased funding alone for 'school improvement' in
the urban disadvantaged school districts will never eliminate . . . extreme racial and
ethnic isolation .... ).
120 See Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, Report of Leonard B. Stevens, Ed.D.,
supra note 118
(recommending voluntary student placements only); Bass, supra note 43 (noting that
the plaintiffs have "played footsie with ... the dreaded busing-but have never directly
endorsed" it).
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provide the state with a binding timeline tied to specific integration
goals."'
At the conclusion of the spring 2002 hearings in the superior
court, Judge Aurigemma's comments showed that the important formalistic aspects of the case are still not being weighed. The specific
identities of the defendants still have not been given adequate attention, 12 2 nor have the plaintiffs' identities been observed. 123 By acting
outside the strictures of regular civil procedure to bind political bodies that had no opportunity to defend themselves in court, whatever
remedy the superior court provides is unlikely to appear to the suburban public as a legitimate exercise of the judicial function.
II. OTHERJURISDICTIONS HAVE SOUGHT TO ENFORCE AFFIRMATIVE
OBLIGATIONS, WITH VARYING SUCCESS

Connecticut's struggle with holding the political branches of government judicially accountable for their affirmative obligations is far
from unique. 2' Furthermore, "Hartford's racially isolated schools are
121 The

state defendants entered settlement negotiations with the plaintiffs in midJuly. See Rachel Gottlieb, Sides Seek Sheff Pact: Serious Talks in School DesegregationCase,
HARTFORD COURANT, July 13, 2002, at Al ("The state and the plaintiffs announced
Friday that they are seeking an extension of the deadline to file legal briefs until after
Labor Day to give them time to negotiate for a settlement."). As of this writing, no settlement has been reached. The effects of a settlement on future opportunities to enforce affirmative obligations remain unclear.
122See Robert A. Frahm, Sheff Judge Asks for Proposals: Both Sides in the Landmark
School Desegregation Case Are BeingAsked to Give Suggestions About How the Court Should Proceed, HARTFORD COURANT, May 4, 2002, at BI ("And to whom would the court direct
an order? 'Is it only the state?' [Judge Aurigemma] asked after hearing the final witness. 'Is it Hartford? Is it the suburban [school] districts?"'). Normally, courts direct
orders against the defendants before them, and judges identify those defendants by
determining whom the plaintiffs have sued. To do otherwise is not only ineffective,
but is generally considered a violation of due process. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755, 762 (1989) ("Ajudgment or decree among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues
as among them, but it does not conclude the rights of strangers to those proceedings."); Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co., 657 A.2d 212, 217-18 (Conn.
1995) (barring evidence related to non-parties as prejudicial to defendant). Neither
the state, nor Hartford, nor the suburban districts were named as defendants in Sheff
Supra note 52 and accompanying text.
See Frahm, supra note 122 ("[T~he state's final witness, New Haven
school official Edward Linehan, testified that New Haven has been able to develop a successful
magnet school program under existing state policies and without court intervention.").
Note that none of the plaintiffs lives in New Haven, nor are conditions in New Haven
the subject of the complaint.
124See Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Efficacy and Engagement:
The Remedies
ProblemPosed by Sheff v. O'Neill-anda Proposed Solution, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1115, 1133
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typical."' 25 Thus, courts from the federal system and from other states
may offer a useful comparison for techniques for enforcing affirmative
obligations." 6 To that end, this Part first reviews federal precedents
dealing with affirmative obligations, though these are rare under the
U.S. Constitution and are more often limited by federalism concerns
than by the separation of powers problem typically faced by state
courts. Federal cases reviewed include those dealing with school desegregation, where the federal courts sitting in equity have supervised
massive institutional reform. Next, this Part will briefly survey recent
cases based on constitutions from Connecticut's sister states in the areas of public campaign finance reform, legislative reapportionment,
education, and judicial branch funding. In all of these cases, particular attention will be devoted to the role of procedural technicalities in
securing an effective remedy in light of the special difficulties of affirmative obligations.
A. Federal Courts Have Struggled with Affirmative ConstitutionalObligations
Perhaps the most significant federal school desegregation case in
In Jenkins, the U.S. Surecent years has been Missouri v. Jenkins.
preme Court held that where the historical dejure segregation sought
to be reversed had not extended beyond school district lines, no fedThe district court had
erally mandated remedy could so extend.
overreached its authority by ordering the funding of magnet schools
and other educationally appealing features designed to attract subur-

(1997) ("The Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Sheff to allow the legislature
broad, unstructured discretion to formulate a remedy is... consistent with ... general
state court approach [es].").
125

Fossey, supra note 42, at 168.
But cf Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on the

Process of ConstitutionalBorrowing, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 640, 646 (1999) (positing that
"the history of the use of comparative analysis in American law suggests that the result
is often as oppressive as liberating").
127515 U.S. 70 (1995). For comments on the case's significance for contemporary
civil rights advocates, see Raina E. Brubaker, Comment, Missouri v.Jenkins: Widening
the Mistakes ofMilliken v. Bradley, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 579, 580-81 (1996) (recounting, inter alia, Jesse Jackson's description of the Jenkins holding as "devastating").
18 See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 76 ("Because it had found no
interdistrict violation, the
District Court could not order mandatory interdistrict redistribution of students between the [Kansas City school district] and the surrounding [suburban school districts].").
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ban students into Kansas City's schools. 9 The Court reached this
holding despite its awareness that any remedy strictly limited to operation within the city lines would likely result in extreme racial isolation
due to 130
the small number of white students residing in Kansas City
proper.
Two central axioms governing the Court's rationale in Jenkins are
uniquely relevant to the federal nature of U.S. courts: the requirement that only de jure segregation can constitutionally be addressed,"' and the need for federal courts to respect the states' historical dominance in the field of education."' Both of these concerns
33
were strongly emphasized in the earlier case of Milliken v. Bradley,1
which held that "[b]oundary lines may be bridged where there has
been a constitutional violation calling for interdistrict relief, but the
notion that school district lines may be casually ignored or treated as a
mere administrative convenience is contrary to the history of public
education in our country." 13 4 Plainly, the significance of school district
lines varies from state to state, and states have largely retained a more
significant control over those boundary lines than has the federal government. The issue of de jure versus de facto segregation also carries
different connotations in the federal context than it does under state
constitutions, which in many instances include more vigorous equal
protection clauses than does the U.S. Constitution. 3 5 Incredibly, Justice Thomas, writing separately in Jenkins, quoted the unequivocal declaration in Brown v. Board of Education that "[s] eparate educational fa-

See id. (noting the district court's approval of "a comprehensive magnet school
and capital improvements plan").
130 See id. at 87 ("We also rejected '[t]he
suggestion ... that schools which have a
majority of Negro students are not "desegregated," whatever the makeup of the school
district's population... ' (alterations in original) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717, 747 n.22 (1974))); id. at91 & n.5 (citing cases to support the majority's contention that racially isolated school districts may still be considered "desegregated" for
U.S. constitutional purposes).
131 See id. at 102 ("[T]he remedial quality education
program should be tailored to
remedy the injuries suffered by the victims of prior dejure segregation.").
3 See id. at 88 (noting that "'federal courts ...
must take into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the
Constitution"' (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977))).
1. 418 U.S.
717 (1974).
129

134

Id. at 741.

135See G.ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 169 (1998) (highlighting the potential for state judges to offer their citizens state constitutional civil
rights above the federal floor).
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cilities are inherently unequal" 136 to support his proposition that
"there is no reason to think that black students cannot learn as well
when surrounded by members of their own race as when they are in
an integrated environment. "1 This proposition reflects a fundamental assumption that integration is really a matter of educational policy,
rather than of legal obligation; that assumption is false in states like
Connecticut that have affirmative constitutional obligations to provide
an integrated education.
One aspect of Jenkins that does have potential applicability to state
desegregation law comes from Justice O'Connor's mitigating concurrence. She opined that the social factors responsible for segregation
"are not readily corrected by judicial intervention, but are best addressed by the representative branches; time and again, we have recognized the ample authority legislatures possess to combat racial in13
Even this concept is tinged with implied federalism and
justice.""
comity concerns (consider the plural "legislatures," suggesting that
the "representative branches" referenced are really state institutions),
but the idea can be at least roughly transported to state court concerns about separation of powers. 39 In federal desegregation cases
like Milliken and Jenkins, and more generally whenever separation of
powers concerns are raised to limit the equitable enforcement of constitutional obligations, much more attention is paid to the inherent
limitations of the judiciary than to the institutional weaknesses of the

136

Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 120 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of

Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)).
137 Id. at 121-22. Whether or not separate is still inevitably unequal
as a matter of
law under the Federal Constitution, the Connecticut Supreme Court's holding in Sheff
denies the possibility that racially isolated schools could ever be constitutionally
"equal." Therefore, in Connecticut, at least, academic discussion of the potential educational benefits from single-race schooling is legally irrelevant. But cf Alicia L. Mioli,
Note, Sheff v. O'Neill: The Consequence ofEducationalTable-Scrapsfor Poor Urban Minority
Schools, 27 FORD1-AM URB. L.J. 1903, 1942 (2000) (arguing that it is more important to
improve the quality of racially isolated urban schools than to institute "integrationist"
programs devoted to getting "white students and minority students [to] sit next to each
other in the classroom").
1" Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 112 (O'Connor,J., concurring) (citation omitted).
139 Since most state court judges are elected, Wefing, supra note 67, at 55, most
state judiciaries are themselves politically "representative branches." Given the context, though, Justice O'Connor probably did not mean to include judiciaries in her
phrase. Whether electoral accountability provides state judges with greater moral
authority to interfere with their coordinate branches than federal judges possess remains an open question.
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other branches.140 One might look at the history of the Jenkins litigation itself for a ready example. The case began in 1977'1' and has
been in and out of court ever since, having been remanded by the
Eighth Circuit for further proceedings as recently as 2000.142 While
this protracted history could be explained as illustrative of the courts'
failure to fashion a suitable remedy, it might just as well be the result
of the political branches' failure to comply with the law as judicially
construed. If the latter reason is more persuasive, the solution is likely
43
to be more judicial intervention, not less.
B. Other State Courts Have Struggled with Affirmative Constitutional
Obligations
Four cases in four different areas of law-three decided this year
and one more than three decades old-illustrate different state
courts' techniques for enforcing affirmative constitutional obligations.
Each case will be discussed in turn, with close attention paid to any
procedural characteristics that affected the courts' potential remedies.
44
In Bates v. Director of the Office of Campaign & PoliticalFinance,'
decided February 25, 2002, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
addressed the troubling question of the legislature's failure to fund a
campaign finance statute passed by popular initiative. 14s In Bates,
twenty-eight individual plaintiffs and four associations 146 brought a suit
(but apparently not a class action) seeking primarily injunctive relief
against the two state officials responsible for campaigns and elec-

140

See Rebell & Hughes, supra note 124, at 1123 (observing that "the critics of ju-

dicial activism approach the issue [of remedies] myopically by focusing on the institutional limitations of the judicial branch, while ignoring the institutional shortcomings
of the legislative and executive branches in promoting sound reform").
Sch. Dist. v. Missouri, 438 F. Supp. 830 (W.D.
Mo. 1977).
142 Jenkins ex rel. Jenkins v. Missouri,
216 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2000).
143 Similar problems to those
in the school desegregation cases arise for federal

courts exercising supervisory responsibilities over prison authorities' affirmative obligations to provide safe and adequate conditions of incarceration, with mixed results. See
Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies ofJudicial Intervention in Prisons,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 808 (1990) (complaining that "[c]ritics [ofjudicial activism]

emphasize the limitations ofjudicially managed change without addressing the failure
of the responsible officials to comply with the law and the absence of any realistic alternative means to remedy ongoing constitutional and statutory violations").
144 763 N.E.2d 6 (Mass.
2002).
145
146

Id. at9.

Id. at 6 n.l.
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tions.14 The complaint was founded on the Massachusetts legislature's refusal to appropriate money to effectuate a clean elections law
passed by popular initiative
S•
148pursuant to procedures detailed in the
Massachusetts Constitution.
The plaintiffs "sought permanent injunctive relief ordering the director [of campaign and political finance] to provide public campaign funds to all candidates entitled to
such funds, and barring the Secretary [of the Commonwealth] from
holding any elections unless and until such funds had been made
available to all eligible candidates. '49
The court noted that the constitutional clause providing for popular initiatives "is plain and unambiguous. If a measure properly enacted by the people is not repealed, the Legislature 'shall' raise by
taxation or otherwise and 'shall' appropriate funds to 'carry such law
into effect."" 50 Ultimately, the Bates court held that despite this plain
constitutional obligation, the plaintiffs' case for injunctive relief failed
because the defendant director "has no clean elections funds to distribute and no authority on his own to reach those funds."15 1 Even so,
the court reached the question of the non-party legislature's obligations, declaring that the state constitution indeed mandated that the
legislature either repeal or fund the campaign finance reform laws.
This obligation gave rise to a cognizable claim at law for one of the
plaintiffs, a gubernatorial candidate who had already been certified as
On that basis, and
eligible for public financing for his campaign.
despite a vigorous sovereign immunity defense by the commonwealth,
the court directed that the certified candidate (alone among the
plaintiffs) be awarded the funds he had been promised by the state's
54
campaign finance director.
Interestingly, the Bates court, like Connecticut's Sheff court, felt
free to declare the legislature's constitutional responsibilities even

147 Id. at

10.
Id.at 9.
149Id. at 10.
150Id. (construing MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, pt.
2, § 2).
151 Id. at
11.
148

152 See id. at 24 ("We have determined that [the
Massachusetts Constitution] mandates that the Legislature. . . 'appropriate such money as may be necessary' to carry
the clean elections law into effect." (quoting MASS. CONST. amend, art. XLVIll, pt. 2, §
2)). 21) Id. at 24-28.

154

See id. at 30-31 (enteringjudgment for the certified candidate against the direc-

tor in the amount of $811,050).
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though the legislature had not been made a party to the action and
no relief was sought directly against it. Also like the Sheff court, once
the Bates majority decided that the legislature's failure to act was unconstitutional, the court ceased its review and declined to command
any specific remedy, except with respect to the narrow issue of the
single candidate who had already been certified. That exception presents a difference between the Bates and Sheff courts, in that the Massachusetts court was closely attentive to the claims and rights of the
specific plaintiffs before it. Providing a damages remedy to one plaintiff but denying the drastic injunctive relief sought by the rest may
have permitted the court to demonstrate to the legislature that its affirmative obligations would be enforced without provoking widespread hostility against the court from the political branches. This
conclusion may be supported by the Bates court's direction that a single justice would retain jurisdiction over the case in the event future
1 55
plaintiffs became eligible for relief.
The Idaho case of Bingham County v. Idaho Commission for Reappor-

tionment, decided March 1, 2002, offers a simpler fact pattern and a
seemingly simpler judicial remedy, but also illustrates firm judicial
correction of a legislature's failure to meet affirmative constitutional
obligations. The Idaho Constitution establishes a bipartisan citizens'
commission to draw new legislative districts after each decennial census.15 7 After the Idaho Supreme Court found the commission's first

proposed plan impermissible under the Federal Constitution for having too great a population deviation among districts, the commission
158
submitted a new plan, with an even greater population deviation.
The acknowledged purpose of the districts' wide deviation was to

155

Justice Martha Sosman, exercising her retained jurisdiction, was so dissatisfied

with the commonwealth's compliance that she threatened to auction off state property. See Massachusetts Ordered to Finance Campaign Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, § 1
("'This unquestionably inflicts needless damage on the commonwealth,' Justice Sosman wrote. 'However, the only way to break this impasse is to let the auctioneer's
hammer fall again and again."'). By mid-July, the legislature had still not appropriated
clean elections funds and state land was auctioned off to pay for candidates' campaigns. See Benjamin Gedan, Clean Elections Auction Falls Short: Lakeville Land Sale
Brings Just $2.4M, BOSTON GLOBE, July 11, 2002, at B7 ("The Supreme Judicial Court
ordered the sale of state property to fund the [campaign finance] law, and a set of
SUVs were sold at an earlier auction. Last night's sale [was] the first to include stateowned land ....).
156 No. 28153/28197, 2002 Ida. LEXIS 35
(Idaho Mar. 1, 2002).
157 Id. at
*2.
Id. at *2-3.
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maintain the integrity of political subdivisions (counties), in accordance with a provision of the Idaho Constitution requiring that political subdivisions be kept whole to the maximum extent possible, consistent with federal law."' The Bingham County court noted, however,
that the commission had split some counties but not others without
apparent reason, and consequently invalidated the new reapportionment plan."O By way of remedy, the court simply directed the commission to prepare and submit a new plan,"' thereby enforcing the
legislature's affirmative constitutional obligation to develop an appropriate plan.
On February 21, 2002, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided a
complex case known as Abbott v. Burke, dealing with educational equity.
The named plaintiffs were twenty urban schoolchildren; they
sued the state commissioner of education, budget director, treasurer,
and the state board of education for failure to comply with earlier enforcement orders of the court. 16 The Abbott litigation has a lengthy
history in New Jersey; the state courts first addressed the case in
1984164 and this year's decision marks the seventh time the state supreme court has adjudicated between the parties.
The plaintiffs argued that preschool programs established by court order in special atrisk school districts (known as "Abbott districts") remained inadequate 166 and sought as relief the implementation of a complex administrative scheme anchored on "the appointment of a judge of the Superior Court to hear and resolve anticipated disputes.",6 7 In a lengthy
opinion heavily reliant on details of school administration, the Abbott
court decided that although administrative agency compliance with
the court's earlier mandates concerning the preschool programs was
inconsistent enough to be "troubl[ing]," s the state had made sub159

Id. at *6 (citing IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 5).

160 Bingham County, 2002 Ida. LEXIS 35, at *13-19.

Id. at *24-25.
790 A.2d 842 (NJ. 2002).
163 Id. at 844-45.
164 See Abbott v. Burke, 477 A.2d 1278 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1984) (holding
that a court may determine if the inequality of educational opportunities is of such
magnitude as to be unconstitutional).
165 See Abbott, 790 A.2d at 844-45 ("As before, the [plaintiffs]
allege[] that the
161
162

Commissioner of Education (Commissioner) has failed to comply with the Court's
mandate in Abbott V, and now Abbott VI .... ).
166See id. at 845 (describing the plaintiffs' complaint).
167 Id.
168 Id. at 847.
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stantial progress' 61'and as such no new judicial intervention was warranted. 70 After its long years of facing the Abbott litigation, the New
Jersey Supreme Court felt qualified to provide responsible state officials with a set of highly detailed requirements for education to be
constitutional in NewJersey, down to exactly what preschool curricula
were to be employed in the different Abbott districts."' However, the
court's descent into extrajudicial detail left little room for explication
of the broader historical, moral, and structural trends operating behind the law. While education bureaucrats were provided with a concrete framework for how to come into compliance, the Abbott opinion
was not noticeably attentive to the traditional purposes of a constitution.
The extraordinary complexity of the Abbott court's opinion, and
the court's obvious familiarity with the minutiae of educational policy
and procedure, could cause great irritation for someone who believes
courts should restrain themselves from imposing remedies requiring
continuing judicial activism. Even the Abbott court itself refused the
plaintiffs' request that it adopt a more interventionist jurisprudence.
However, New Jersey's progress toward educational equity and improved schools for racially and economically isolated children has
clearly been accelerated by the supreme court's willingness to impose
obligations on its coordinate branches of government.
The final state example of enforcement of affirmative constitutional obligations is the 1971 Pennsylvania Supreme Court case of
Commonwealth ex rel. Carrollv. 7ate.17 The presidentjudge of the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia brought a class action seeking mandamus on behalf of all Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas judges to
force the city's executive and legislative branches to fund the court
system adequately.1 73 The remarkable issues facing the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, as it saw them, were whether the judiciary had the
"inherent" power to determine how much money it needed, and if so,
whether it could force the other branches to supply the necessary
169 See id. ("Today, three out of every five children in the
Abbott districts participate in those programs. Much has been accomplished.").
70 See id. ("[W]e cannot justify a new and superseding
role for the courts in this
matter.").
171 See, e.g., id. at 849-50 (listing specific educational
opportunities available in
twenty-four Abbott districts and requiring a plan to ensure development of curricula by
a specific deadline).
172

274 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1971).
at 194.

173 Id.
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funds.
The court majority used strong moral language, looking to
the fundamental structures of republicanism, to hold that such power
75
was inherent in the constitutional scheme of tripartite government.
The courts' "inherent power to preserve the efficient and expeditious
administration of Justice" provided sufficient authority to "protect
[that power] from being impaired or destroyed."1 76 By way of remedy,
the plaintiffs sought no mere declaratory judgment or voluntary
change in legislative priorities; despite "the deplorable financial conditions in Philadelphia,"' 177 the Carroll court affirmed a trial court
judgment awarding
nearly 2.5 million (1970) dollars to the Philadel178
phia court system.
The Carroll court never examined any potential problems in obtaining compliance with the monetary award, merely ordering the defendants to provide the court of common pleas with the courtawarded amount. 179 This loud silence might have been deliberately
designed to avoid calling attention even to the possibility of noncompliance. It may also have been that the city's cooperation in the
early stages of the case provided an adequate bonding mechanism to
effectuate the laterjudgment. If no security had been provided, and
a city council majority had failed to appropriate the funds after judgment, from whom might the court have realistically been able to compel compliance? Once again, the identity of the parties to the case
may solve the problem: The defendants were the mayor, finance director, treasurer, city council president, and the city councillors individually, all named in their official capacities. 8 The least messy judicial solution to noncompliance would probably have been to order

174

Id.

See id. at 197 ("Because of the basic functions and inherent powers of the three
co-equal Branches of Government, the co-equal independent Judiciary must possess
rights and powers co-equal with its functions and duties, including the right and power
to protect itself against any impairment thereof.").
176 Id.
177 Id. at 199.
178 Id. at 200 (affirming the judgment below, but reducing it proportionately "to
175

reflect the amount of time remaining in this fiscal year" and ultimately granting
$1,365,555).
179 Id.
180See id. at 195 ("[A]n agreement was worked out by the parties [at a pretrial
conference] that defendants would hold and keep available sufficient funds to pay any
sums ultimately awarded to the Court.").
181 Id. at 194 n.1.
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the finance director to disburse the money to the courts, whether or
s
not the executive and legislative branches had directed it elsewhere. 8
III. AFFIRMATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS CAN BE
SUCCESSFULLY ENFORCED BY STATEJUDICIARIES

Connecticut's Chief Justice Peters, by then no longer sitting on
the court, told a New York University Law School audience in 1998
that "the availability of remedial flexibility led [the state supreme
court], in our school desegregation case, Sheff v. O'Neill, deliberately
83
to craft a mandate that ... underenforced our state constitutionallaw.'0
Unfortunately, the segregated schoolchildren of Hartford have borne
the brunt of that willful underenforcement. Chief Justice Peters and
the Sheff court may have felt obliged to compromise in the face of intensely emotional opposition to court-ordered desegregation. 8 4 However, leaving the solution to such a controversial problem in the hands
of the very people who violated the constitution in the first place is
asking the lion to mind the lamb. Governor Rowland's blocking the
integration of Hartford Public High School in 2002 by political means
is not like Governor Faubus's blocking the integration of Little Rock
High School in 1957 by means of force. However, Governor Rowland
still has serious reasons to resent any judicial desegregation order.
Even if the governor were just a regular private litigant and somehow
not accountable to the suburban electorate (and so naturally resistant
to any counter-majoritarian decree), it would be extraordinary and
unjust for a court to leave the choice of remedy entirely to the discre-

tion of a defendant already found liable for violations of the community's fundamental law.
The Sheff court exercised wishful thinking in assuming that the
"energy and good will"' 5 of the political branches would jump into ac182

Cf Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 280 (1990) (holding that while con-

tempt sanctions were permissible against a city found to be in contempt of a federal
district court, fines against city councillors not named as defendants in the original action were an abuse of the court's discretion to craft equitable remedies).
183 Ellen A. Peters, Capacity and Respect: A Perspective on
the Historic Role of the State
Courts in the Federal System, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1065, 1071

(1998) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).
184 See Rebell & Hughes, supra note 124, at 1152 ("Deep-seated
public opposition
to desegregation, fiscal equity, and other highly controversial decisions undoubtedly
has affected the courts' ability and willingness to ensure the implementation of effective remedies in these cases.").
185 Sheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1290 (Conn. 1996).
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tion to send impoverished inner-city minority children flooding into
wealthy white suburban schools. Whether the failure to provide specific timelines and desegregation targets was the result of intra-court
politics, reluctance to confront the political majority, or even a genuine belief in the philosophy of judicial restraint, the result for Connecticut's constitution and schools has been devastating. The plaintiffs' lawyer Philip Tegeler has succinctly described the state's failure
to comply with the supreme court's holding as a "constitutional crisis"
in Connecticut. 186 In contrast to the muddied logic of the Sheff case,
recall the unmistakably clear commands of the U.S. Supreme Court's
unanimously authored opinion in Cooper v. Aaron,"" enforcing the supremacy of the Federal Constitution and demanding political officials'
compliance with the lower courts' desegregation decrees:
It is, of course, quite true that the responsibility for public education
is primarily the concern of the States, but it is equally true that such responsibilities, like all other state activity, must be exercised consistently

with federal constitutional requirements as they apply to state action.
The Constitution created a government dedicated to equal justice under
law. The Fourteenth Amendment embodied and emphasized that
ideal.... The right of a student not to be segregated on racial grounds
in schools... is indeed so fundamental
8 and pervasive that it is embraced
in the concept of due process of law.1

The Cooper opinion recognized that continued refusal by state officials
affirmatively to desegregate the nation's schools threatened not only
the welfare of affected children, but also the entire relationship between the Constitution, as construed by the U.S. Supreme Court, and
the rest of the country. 9 There is no reason to doubt the equal seriousness of state officials' declining to follow state supreme court mandates. The ability of state courts to assert their authority under state
constitutions, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did in Carroll,must
be available for the maintenance of the rule of law and constitutional
order.
A substantively more innovative and procedurally more traditional
remedy could provide the fully enforceable remedy the courts have
been missing. The essence of this proposal lies in the state supreme

186 Interview

with Philip Tegeler, supra note 47.
358 U.S. 1 (1958) (Warren, CJ., Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Burton, Clark,
Harlan, Brennan, & Whittaker,JJ.).
188 Id. at 19.
187

189

Id. at 19-20.
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court's realizing its institutional strengths and relying on those
strengths unapologetically. Once the Sheff court determined that the
state constitution demanded an integrated education for Connecticut's students, attention to certain narrow procedural elements of the
case would have helped the court to find an effective, but feasible,
remedy.
To begin with, the court should have remembered and accounted
for the special characteristics of the group of plaintiffs at the bar. Because both white suburban students and inner-city minorities were
pressing their claims together, the court should have treated seriously
the plaintiffs' notion that the constitutional violation was racial isolation, not the effect of such isolation on the quality of education available. An opinion and, more importantly, a remedy confined to this
issue would have been necessarily clear; such de facto segregation is
either permissible or it is not. Determining constitutional compliance
is then literally a matter of facial review. Furthermore, understanding
the identity of the plaintiffs this way would have avoided treating integration as a right of the urban minorities, which provokes the reasonable critique that courts are suggesting that black school children are
unable to learn unless they are surrounded by white school children."0 It is tempting for judges accustomed to deriving principles of
constitutionalism from the federal example to consider constitutions
as establishing "rights against rules,"'9'
but state constitutions are different: in addition to providing negative "rights against rules," the
state constitutions impose affirmative obligations. Recasting these obligations as rights held by the affected parties obscured the Sheff
court's ability to see just what the constitution required. In contrast,
Justice Borden's angry dissent in Sheff correctly foresaw that a "necessary implication" of the majority's opinion, "compelled in part by the
identity of the plaintiffs," is that all overwhelmingly white school districts in Connecticut are equally an affront to the state constitution 1112
as
the overwhelmingly black and Latino school district in Hartford.

190

See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("It

never ceases to amaze me that the courts are so willing to assume that anything that is
predominantly black must be inferior.").
191See Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998) (insisting that it is a basic aspect of constitutional structure that constitutional rights exist only as protection from inappropriate
government action).
192Sheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1331 (Conn. 1996) (Borden,J., dissenting);
see
also id. at 1332 ("[E]very rural and suburban school district, from Litchfield to Pomfret
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Even if that result is not logically compelled by the court's holding,
the majority was mistaken to describe the state's obligations in terms
of the plaintiffs' rights.
If the Sheff court had more clearly understood school integration
as an affirmative obligation of the state, then the natural next step
would have been to define the obligation's contours. What, precisely,
would the named defendants have to do to comply with their constitutional responsibilities? The general assembly's obligations may be
greater or lesser than those of the executive branch officials sued by
the plaintiffs, but since the legislators were not a party to the litigation, the court should have declined to declare their rights and responsibilities. Instead, the court should have reviewed the individual
defendants' liability, one by one, and directed a remedy strictly to correct that liability.
For example, the court might have held that the commissioner of
education's policy-making role in the state's provision of public education meant that his constitutional obligation included the redrawing
of school district lines, using racially-inclusive standards. The court
might then have given the commissioner a deadline by which to present such new district maps. The remedial regime would then be very
similar to that employed in electoral reapportionment cases, which
the Bingham County example from Idaho shows is easily within the capacity of the courts. A similar examination of responsibility and assignment of obligation could be applied to each of the executive officials brought before the Sheff court. The hierarchical nature of the
executive branch would work to the decreeing court's advantage, because agency officials are institutionally habituated to taking and implementing orders from political superiors.
Such an individualized remedy would have the additional advantage of being enforceable against a natural person, rather than a body
politic. It is implausible that any court would (or could) hold an entire legislature in contempt, but the real human being occupying the
office of commissioner can easily be subjected to judicial sanctions
sufficiently serious to encourage constitutionally mandated conduct.
Once the court has made individual determinations of official liability, an eminently judicial task, there should be no hesitancy to
make bold demands on an official's conduct. As one scholar has cor-

and from Greenwich to Granby, is now either clearly or probably unconstitutional ....).
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rectly explained: 'Judicial invocation of separation of powers concerns tojustify deference to legislative oversight often operates as no
more than an abdication to majority preferences, which impedes the
development and the implementation of constitutionally mandated
remedial programs."" ' Since a court's constitutional authority has a
significant moral component, a weakly proffered judicial remedy
(such as one entirely dependent on voluntary remedies) may signal
moral insecurity to the affected public, making compliance less likely
than a bolder decree would inspire. Persistent racism and educational
inequity,9 4 nearly fifty years after Brown v. Board of Education declared
"separate" to be "inherently unequal"'19 5 and thirteen years after Sheff v.
O'Neill required Connecticut to eliminate the separation, is depressing. A court that claims on the one hand that society must take painful and expensive steps to fix the problem because the constitution
demands it, but then relies on purely voluntary measures to achieve a
solution, invites the public's righteous skepticism and resistance.
Therefore, enforcing state constitutional affirmative obligations requires mandatory remedies to protect the legitimacy of the constitutional order as much as to protect the litigants' rights.
With strict attention to formalistic details, joined with explicitly
moral constitutional construction and unhesitating mandatory remedies targeted at individuals, state courts in Connecticut and across the
country have an exemplary opportunity to eliminate a social evil that
has troubled our nation since colonial times. In the words of a national hero: "All we say to America is be true to what you said on pa' 96
per. 0
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Tom Beimers, Note, A Wrong Still in Search of a Remedy: EducationalAdequacy Af

terSheffv. O'Neill, 82 MINN. L. REv. 565, 594 n.157 (1997).
194 See Gayl Shaw Westerman, The Promise of State Constitutionalism:
Can It Be Fulfilled in Sheffv. O'Neill?, 23 HASTINGS CONST, L.Q. 351, 365 (1996) ("Over forty years
after Brown, 63.3% of all black children still attend segregated schools, and in twentyfive of the nation's largest inner-city school districts, more racially segregated schools
exist today than in 1954.").
195 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
196 Martin Luther King,Jr., I've Been to the Mountaintop,
Address at Bishop Charles Mason Temple (Apr. 3, 1968), in A CALL TO CONSCIENCE: THE LANDMARK
SPEECHES OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 207, 213 (Clayborne Carson & Kris
Shepard eds., 2001).

